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Abstract
Organizations are showing great interest in storing data on public clouds. This
could be a result of the unprecedented growth of data recorded in the last few years.
However the security issues associated with data storage over cloud is a major
discouraging factor for potential adopters. Hence the focus of today is to find
cryptographic techniques that will offer more than confidentiality. Homomorphic
encryption is one such method that has interesting applications in cloud. The
objective is to manage and protect the data from the users of a client organization
which wants to store the data on untrusted public clouds. In this thesis a
hybrid cloud framework is proposed that addresses the privacy and trust issues
and provides encrypted storage with public clouds. The proposed method uses
Homomorphic Encryption for protecting the user data and uses a modified file
updation technique to reduce bandwidth consumption during transfer of large
encrypted files.
Keywords: Cloud Computing, Cryptography, Cloud Storage Security, Fully Homomorphic
Encryption, Delta Encoding.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Cloud computing offers a cost-effective solution to manage the IT infrastructure
in a flexible and scalable manner. Cloud computing enables software applications,
deployment platforms, even the computing resources to be made available
on-demand using a pay-as-you-go model. This has drawn a lot of attention towards
the domain in recent years. Today a good number of organizations use the cloud
for their day to day operations and the adoption rate by others are also high [1].
Hosted applications over the Internet have evolved greatly. The web which
originally just consisted of static web pages, today serves as platform for many web
applications that ranges from simple note taking tools to computation intensive
scientific simulation services. One thing that makes such an approach special that
users can outsource data and computation to a remote server that has enough
resources to perform the task within much less time than traditionally running an
equivalent application on the user’s machine. This is also one of the major factors
that are driving the research in the cloud computing technologies.
However there have been concerns with respect to confidentiality and privacy
of data being stored on the clouds. Specifically organizations that handle sensitive
and high-risk data such as medication records, financial details are not convinced
with the security measures currently in-place to protect the data. Further many
public clouds fail to meet the regulatory guidelines required for operations of such
applications.
In recent times there have been reports of many security breaches of cloud
services such as Dropbox [2,3], Last.fm [4,5], and iCloud [6,7]. A study [8] suggests
72% of the IT professionals blame employees for most data breaches, whereas the
rest blame the hackers. It also reveals that 32% data was lost while 18% data was
stolen by employees. This increases the concern of insider attack on public clouds.
1.1 Motivation
In a recent survey [1], 79 % employees said their organization uses SaaS and 45 %
agreed on using IaaS. These numbers indicate a considerable growth and interest in
cloud adoption. In time to come more and more organizations are going to adopt
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cloud based solutions because of the benefits of the cloud infrastructure over the
local traditional IT infrastructure. This will result in moving a large amount of
data to the cloud. Hence more investigation into cloud storage frameworks is
needed so as to make the cloud adoption simple and user friendly. But as the
rate of cloud adoption is growing, the security risks associated with the networked
applications in general and cloud in specific is also growing. This is a major
discouraging factor towards large scale cloud adoption. Due to the security risks,
organizations that are dealing with sensitive information have ignored the cloud
in the past. But as more amount of data is being generated, consumed, processes
and stored in digital form, the operational cost of a traditional IT infrastructure
is becoming very high. Hence organizations that deals with sensitive information
such as health care records are also considering cloud as an option. Hence the
need of secure cloud storage options are growing.
1.2 Objectives
The objective is to develop a framework using which an organization can store its
data on the cloud in a secure manner. The requirements for the framework are as
follows. It should be easy to use and should not depend upon security measures
taken by the end users e.g. the employees of the organization or users of a service
provided by the organization. It should handle all the cryptographic operations
within the trusted infrastructure of the organization and then send the encrypted
data to the cloud. The public clouds in which the encrypted data is stored should
not have the ability to decrypt the content. It should handle file uploads in an
efficient manner to reduce bandwidth consumption.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
Rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes cloud computing
from a security perspective. It includes notes on recent works on security
assessment of cloud. Chapter 3 describes Homomorphic Encryption schemes. It
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provides details on the homomorphic properties of some cryptosystems and notes
on recent developments in this area. In Chapter 4 a framework for secure data
storage on cloud is proposed. A detailed description of the framework along with
all components are described in the chapter. Chapter 5 provides notes on the
implementation of the framework introduced in Chapter 4 and it also describes
the performance of the framework. Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks and
notes for possible enhancements.
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Cloud Computing: A Security Perspective
In simple words, Cloud computing can be described as a method that allow
resources to be made available over a network in general and Internet in specific.
A more formal definition by NIST defines cloud computing as follows. Cloud
computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction [9]. NIST
definition also includes five essential characteristics, three service models, and four
deployment models for cloud. An overview of the same is presented in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Cloud Computing Overview
Essential Characteristics of the cloud:
On-demand self-service: It allows a consumer to provision resources such as server,
storage, network and the like as required without manual interaction with service
providers. This facilitates quick deployment and provides the consumers flexibility
to make any changes as they see fit.
Broad network access: The services offered by the cloud are provided over the
network using standard protocols so that the services can be easily accessed from a
number of client devices such as workstations, laptops, tablets, and mobile phones.
6
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This gives consumers the flexibility to choose a platform of their choice to work
with.
Resource Pooling: The cloud follows a multi-tenant model in which computing
resources are pooled and the resources are dynamically allocated as per the need
of the consumers. This provides location independence as the consumer is not
aware of the exact physical location of a resource in the cloud. Although the
physical location from where the resource should reside can be controlled at a
higher abstraction level by specifying certain geographical limits. As an example
a consumer in some country can specify to keep its storage limited within physical
infrastructure of the home country only.
Rapid Elasticity: Additional resources can be easily provisioned or released as per
the demand. In the cloud the resource availability appear virtually unlimited and
resources can be requested in any quantity depending upon requirements. The
cloud should handle the scaling as needed.
Measured Service: In order to maintain a transparent record of the resource usage
both for the providers and the consumers the cloud systems often use a metering
capability depending on the kind of service being provided. This helps many
activities such as billing, setting quotas on resource usage, and auditing.
Service Models in Cloud Computing:
Software as a Service (SaaS): It includes services where the consumers are given
access to applications deployed on the cloud infrastructure of the providers. The
applications are accessed using various device platforms through web browser,
or some native applications interface. In this case the consumers do not have
the control over the cloud infrastructure. Still they can specify certain limited
configuration settings.
Platform as a Service (PaaS): It provides the consumer the ability to deploy
an application onto the cloud infrastructure of the provider using development
environment supported by the provider. Here the consumers do not have the
control over the cloud infrastructure of the provider but do have good control over
the applications deployed by them.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): It provides the consumers ability to provision
7
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basic computing resources such as servers, storage, and networks on top of the
cloud infrastructure of the provider. In this case the consumers have more
control over the resources provisioned and can configure it as needed e.g. the
consumers have choice in selecting operating system or installing any software on
a provisioned virtual machine. But the consumers still do not manage or control
the cloud infrastructure of the provider.
Deployment Models in Cloud Computing:
Private Cloud: This type of cloud infrastructure is provisioned by a single
organization for its exclusive use. It allows the organization more control over
the underlying infrastructure and gives feeling of enhanced security. It may be
managed by by the organization or some third party.
Community Cloud: This type of cloud infrastructure is targeted towards a selected
group or community of consumers belonging to organizations with related goals.
It may be managed by one or more of the organizations involved, or by some third
party.
Public Cloud: This kind of cloud infrastructure is available for use by the public.
Public cloud services are getting a lot of attention as it reduces the efforts needed
for managing the infrastructure. This allows the consumers to focus more on their
objectives. However it also raises many security concerns. It is mostly managed
by the providers themselves.
Hybrid Cloud: This kind of cloud infrastructure comprises of two or more forms
of the previous cloud infrastructures where interactions among the different
infrastructures are made possible by using standardized or proprietary data and
application interaction methods.
Recent works done in the context of cloud security is briefly described below.
Chen and Zhao provides an analysis [10] of data security throughout seven
phased data life cycle namely Generation, use, transfer, share, storage, archival,
and destruction. In data storage, they have mentioned key management as an
important point. Again in data destruction phase it is important to ensure that
data is securely erased using methods that makes it unrecoverable. Otherwise an
adversary can take advantage of the physical characteristics of the storage medium
8
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to access sensitive information.
[11] addresses security issues related to both single and multi-cloud models.
Authors have evaluated the security of single clouds based on three factors, namely
data integrity, data intrusion, and service availability. Data integrity is important
since the data can get corrupted during transmission or transfer between data
source and the cloud. The scenarios involving use of multiple clients and devices
for interactions with the cloud further complicates the data integrity requirement.
Another security factor is the data intrusion, in which the adversary gains access
to a cloud service through stolen passwords and then can cause damage to the
services being used by the genuine users. Service availability is also another factor
to be considered.
An execution model called HybrEx (Hybrid Execution) model has been
proposed by Ko, Jeon, and Morales [12]. This model is designed with a view
to ensure confidentiality and privacy. It operates by utilizing the public clouds for
non-sensitive data and computation, while the sensitive data and computations
are performed with in the private cloud infrastructure of the organization. The
model supports application level partitioning i.e. when an application works with
both public and private data, two separate partitions of the applications are made,
one that involves the public data is made to run on the public cloud whereas the
other one runs on the private cloud. It also allows integrations of additional
computing or storage resources to the private cloud from public clouds without
compromising the confidentiality or privacy of data. Although this approach
provides security benefits but this model avoids the public clouds for sensitive
data and computation.
Another scheme due to Jajodia, Litwin, and Schwarz utilizes client-side
encryption for ensuring privacy of outsourced data [13]. This scheme involves
use of symmetric keys to protect data and uses Diffie-Hellman scheme for
authenticating clients. Here the data is encrypted using a symmetric encryption
with a unique key. The keys are cached at the client side and are also kept on the
cloud as backup. A key on the cloud is kept hidden in a Public Share produced by
the owner which belongs to a two-share secret. The secret is the key and the other
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share called the Client Share is specific to the owner and each selected reader.
In [14] authors provide security assessment of cloud in 4 categories, namely
Traditional security in a computer network, Availability of cloud computing
applications, Third-party data privacy, and Third-party data control. The
traditional security covers issues such as attacks on virtual machines, cloud
provider weaknesses, authentication and authorization, and data stealing or
leakage.
The vulnerabilities involving critical applications are described in availability of
cloud computing applications. This includes cloud application uptime, single point
of failure, valid computation. The third-party data privacy describes issues in
context of auditability, SLAs, and design of cloud infrastructure. The third-party
data control presents issues related to third-party data usage and the level of
control the owner have to control it. This involves fixed response time and data
deletion assurance, cloud data stealing, and losing data access.
In guidelines on security and privacy in cloud computing [15], NIST cites insider
security threats as a problem against trust. Security concerns in context of data
isolation in multi-tenant environment of cloud, and data sanitization measures are
also described.
Another survey [16] by Subashini and Kavitha, highlights the security issues
across the different service models of the cloud computing. Some of security
aspects with focus on data being stored in the cloud is presented below.
Data confidentiality:
The common solution for data confidentiality is data encryption. In order to
ensure the effective encryption, the key strength and the encryption algorithm
both should be analyzed. As the cloud computing environment involves large
amounts of data transmission, and storage hence the processing speed and
computational efficiency of encrypting large amounts of data should be taken into
consideration. Since large number of users are also involved hence key management
is a key problem as well. Ideally the data owners should be responsible for key
management. But due to the lack of expertise to manage the keys, users usually
entrust the key management to the cloud providers. As the cloud providers need
10
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to maintain keys for a large number of users, key management is getting more
complex and difficult.
Data locality:
In the SaaS model of cloud computing infrastructure, consumers use the
softwares and tools provided by SaaS vendors, to process their business data. The
customer anyhow does not know where the data is being stored and processed.
Sometimes this is not desirable because of several privacy laws prevalent in
many countries. So the locality of data is very important in many enterprise
applications. In many European countries, certain confidential data should not
leave the country. A secure SaaS model should thus provide reliability to the
customer on the location of the data.
Data integrity:
In a standalone system with a single database, data integrity is easily achieved
using the database constraints. Transactional data integrity is ensured by following
the ACID(Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, Durability) properties. However
in a distributed system, multiple databases and applications are maintained.
Also transactions are performed along multiple data sources. To perform them
in a failsafe manner, a centralized transaction management is required. SaaS
applications are generally multi-tenant applications hosted by a third party. SaaS
applications generally use XML based APIs. For a web service transaction
management poses a problem due to lack of support for transactions at the HTTP
protocol level. So API level support is required. Most SaaS vendors expose their
web services APIs without any support for transactions. The lack of integrity
controls at the data level can result into data corruption, hence developers must
ensure that the integrity of the data is not compromised.
Data access:
The issue of data access is related to the security policies followed by the cloud
provider for accessing the data. Security policies should be designed with a view
to control the access to the data by the category of the user. For example regular
users should be allowed to access critical or sensitive data and it should be ensured
that the data is only accessible by a privileged user. Following the security policies
11
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is the key to prevent intrusions by unauthorized users.
Data segregation:
Because of the multi-tenancy feature of the cloud infrastructure, data of several
users share same physical storage location, thus giving rise to the possibility of
data intrusion. This can be achieved by hacking through some vulnerability or
by injecting client code. It will allow intrusion into others data. A SaaS model
should thus maintain proper isolation between the data of from different users.
Data deletion: Local data deletion is often received with less attention but
in case of cloud since the data is being stored in remote servers to which the
user do not have physical access, hence data deletion in case of cloud is also
important. A delete request for a particular data should be processed with secure
data deletion practices to ensure that the data cannot be recovered later. The
cloud provider should guarantee data deletion as more and more organizations are
storing sensitive data in the cloud. If data is not deleted securely then it can be
recovered by an adversary and will be misused.
12
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Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which allows specific types
of computations to be carried out on ciphertext and obtain an encrypted result
which when decrypted gives the result of operations performed on the plaintext.
For example, one could add two encrypted numbers and then another could
decrypt the result, without either of them being able to find the value of the
individual numbers.
Methods that would allow operation on data without knowing the actual
content can help in lot of areas. Homomorphic encryption is one such method.
Today most systems operate with help of a trusted party. Users have to trust an
entity, human or machine to maintain secrecy of their data. But an attack on
the trusted party or vulnerability with the system can expose the users secret.
Hence the necessity of systems where even the service providers have no detailed
knowledge of the users data is growing. In the next section, some of the work
done in the area of homomorphic encryption is described.
Homomorphic encryption originated from the concept of privacy
homomorphism [17], introduced by the Rivest et al. In their paper, they
discussed about performing operations on the encrypted data. The RSA [18]
cryptosystem introduced by them also exhibited the property of partially
homomorphic encryption, allowing multiplication of encrypted data, which when
decrypted will give the product of the plaintexts. Ever since many schemes with
homomorphic properties have been proposed. Another cryptosystem developed
during the same period was the ElGamal Cryptosystem [19]. Developed and
named after Taher El Gamal, ElGamal cryptosystem also had some homomorphic
properties. Although these two cryptosystems in their basic form is not that
popular but still serves as a great introduction to the concept and many variation
of the basic scheme are used in some applications. Paillier cryptosystem [20],
developed by Pascal Paillier is one of the popular cryptosystem supporting
additive homomorphism. Although the scheme is partially homomorphic but its
simplicity and performance makes it one of the best homomorphic scheme today.
However, a cryptosystem that supports both additive and multiplicative
homomorphism has been investigated since a long time. In that context,
14
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Boneh-Goh-Nissim Cryptosystem [21] provided promising potential for a long
time. It allowed unlimited addition along with one multiplication operation.
But the first fully homomorphic scheme was possible due to Craig Gentry.
Gentry’s scheme [22] involves creating a somewhat homomorphic scheme and
then bootstrapping it make it fully homomorphic.
Although homomorphic encryption has existed since a long time, but due to
its computational and storage overhead it has received less attention. Further the
possibility of a working fully homomorphic encryption in real world was one of the
question. However in recent years development of fully homomorphic encryption
schemes [23–25] have attracted a lot of focus into this field of cryptography.
Homomorphic encryption has great potential for use in scenarios ranging from
multi-party communication to secure computation in cloud systems.
3.1 Mathematical Background
Cryptosystems are designed in a manner such that breaking the system would
require solving a problem that is intractable in nature. Some of the intractable
problems that form the basis for many cryptosystems are described below.
3.1.1 Integer Factorization Problem
Integer factorization or prime factorization is the decomposition of a composite
number into smaller non-trivial divisors, which when multiplied together equal the
original integer. Consider two unknown distinct primes p and q and n = p ∗ q.
Given the product n, the difficulty in determining the primes p and q, is referred
to as the factorization problem.
The general number field sieve (GNFS) algorithm is the best published algorithm
for factoring large n. However in context of quantum computers, Peter Shor
discovered an algorithm in 1994 that solves the factorization problem in polynomial
15
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time. Shor’s algorithm takes only O(b3) time and O(b) space for a b-bit number.
3.1.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Given a generator α ∈ G of a cyclic group of order n, and given some β = αx ∈ G,
the discrete logarithm of β in a base α is the unique value of x mod n. Given β,
the problem of finding x is called the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
3.1.3 Quadratic Residuosity Problem
An integer a is said to be quadratic residue modulo n if there exists 0 < x < n
such that
x2 ≡ a mod n.
Otherwise, a is said to be a non-quadratic residue modulo n.
If n is an odd prime number, then determining whether or not an integer a is a
quadratic residue modulo p is equivalent to calculating Legendre symbol, (a
p
).
Let the set QRn denote the set of quadratic residues modulo n. Then given an
odd composite integer n > 3 and an integer a such that ( a
n
) = 1, the problem of
determining if a ∈ QRn is called the Quadratic Residue Problem.
3.2 Homomorphic Cryptosystems
3.2.1 RSA Cryptosystem
RSA [18] is a popular public-key cryptosystem both in theory and practice that
is used mostly for digital signature. Its strength lies on the intractability of
the integer factorization problem described in the previous section. The basic
RSA scheme including the key generation, encryption and decryption procedure
is described below. Make the Public Key available to everyone and keep the
Private Key a secret.
16
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Algorithm 1 RSA KeyGeneration()
1: Choose two large prime numbers p and q.
2: Compute n = pq and φ(n) = (p− 1).(q − 1).
3: Choose an integer e and an integer d, such that e, is coprime to φ(n) and
1 < e < φ(n).
4: ed ≡ 1 mod m.
5: Public Key = (e, n)
6: Private Key = d
Encryption Procedure
To encrypt, the sender encodes the message into a numerical formM . Encryption
is carried as follows:
EM ≡Me mod n.
Decryption Procedure
To decrypt, the receiver uses the following formula first and then decodes the
obtained number to get the intended Message,
M ≡ EMd mod n.
Homomorphic Properties:
The unpadded RSA exhibits the property of multiplicative homomorphism as
shown below.
Consider two ciphertexts C1 and C2, which are encryptions of plaintexts M1 and
M2.
Then according to the encryption function of RSA, C1 can be written as follows,
C1 = P1
e mod n, where (e, n) is the public key.
Similarly C2 can be expressed as follows,
C2 = P2
e mod n, where (e, n) is the same public key.
Now multiplying the ciphertexts as follows,
C1.C2 mod n = P1
e mod n.P2
e mod n = P1.P2
e mod n
17
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This represents a valid encryption for M1 ∗M2.
However, in real world applications random padding is used in RSA and the
homomorphism does not hold. Hence RSA is not widely used for homomorphic
applications. But still it is one of the oldest cryptosystem with homomorphic
property.
The security of this system rests upon the difficulty in factoring n into p and
q. Hence the numbers p and q must be very large at least 512 bits and n must
be at least 1024 bits to ensure security. So far 768-bit RSA has been broken and
hence higher key sizes are recommended for present and future usage [26].
3.2.2 Paillier Cryptosystem
Introduced in 1999, Paillier cryptosystem [20] is a probabilistic asymmetric
algorithm for public key cryptography that is based on the composite residuosity
classes problem.
An integer z is said to be an nth residue mod n2 if there exists y ∈ Z∗
n2
such
that z ≡ yn mod n2. The main idea, is that it is hard to determine whether
an arbitrary element in Z∗
n2
is an nth residue mod n2 without the underlying
factorization. This is called the decisional composite residuosity assumption
(DCRA).
The key generation, encryption, and decryption procedure, along with the
homomorphic property of the cryptosystem is presented below.
Algorithm 2 Paillier KeyGeneration()
1: Choose two large prime numbers p and q randomly such that gcd(pq, (p −
1)(q − 1)) = 1.
2: Compute n = pq and λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
3: Select random integer g where g ∈ Z∗
n2
4: µ = (L(gλ mod n2))−1 mod n where L(u) = u−1
n
5: PublicKey = (n, g)
6: PrivateKey = (λ, µ)
18
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Algorithm 3 Paillier Encryption()
1: Let m be a message to be encrypted and m ∈ Zn.
2: Select random r where r ∈ Zn.
3: Compute the ciphertext c as c = gm.rn mod n2.
Algorithm 4 Paillier Decryption()
1: Compute the message as m = L(cλ mod n2).µ mod n.
Homomorphic Properties:
Paillier cryptosystem supports the property of additive homomorphism. In this
cryptosystem the product of two ciphertexts will decrypt to the sum of their
corresponding plaintexts. If m1 and m2 are the message to be encrypted, E()
and D() are the encryption and decryption function respectively and n is from
the publicKey, then the additive homomorphism property can be expressed as
follows.
D(E(m1, publicKey) ∗ E(m2, publicKey) mod n
2) = m1 +m2 mod n
Consider c1 and c2 are the ciphertexts of the plaintexts m1 and m2.
Now following the encryption function of Paillier Cryptosystem,
c1 = g
m1.rn1 mod n
2, for some random r1 ∈ Z
∗
n and c2 = g
m2 .rn2 mod n
2, for some
random r2 ∈ Z
∗
n.
Now c1.c2 = g
m1+m2 .(r1r2)
n mod n2.
This represents a valid encryption for m1 +m2.
3.2.3 Boneh-Goh-Nissim Cryptosystem
Boneh, Goh, and Nissim described a homomorphic public key Cryptosystem [21]
based on the subgroup decision problem. In simple terms the subgroup decision
problem can be described as follows. Let G be a group of composite order n = q1q2,
then given x ∈ G, the infeasibility in determining whether x belongs to a subgroup
of order q1, is called the subgroup decision problem. Next the key generation,
encryption and decryption procedure of the cryptosystem is described.
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Algorithm 5 BonehGohNissim KeyGeneration(τ)
1: Given a security parameter τ ∈ Z+, select two random τ -bit primes p and q
and set n = pq ∈ Z.
2: Generate a bilinear group G of order n.
3: Let g be a generator of G and e : GXG→ G1 be the bilinear map.
4: Choose two random generators g, u
R
←− G and set h = uq.
5: PublicKey = (n,G,G1, e, g, h)
6: PrivateKey = p
Algorithm 6 BonehGohNissim Encryption()
1: Message space consists of integers in the set {0, 1, 2, ..., T} with T < q.
2: Choose a random r
R
←− {0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1}.
3: To encrypt a message m, compute C = gmhr ∈ G.
4: Return C as the ciphertext.
Algorithm 7 BonehGohNissim Decryption()
1: Given a ciphertext C, and the private key p the decryption can done on the
basis of the following observation.
2: Cp = (gmhr)p = (gp)m.
3: Compute m as the discrete log of Cp base gˆ, where gˆ = gp.
4: Return m as the decrypted message.
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Homomorphic Properties
This cryptosystem supports additive homomorphism and allows one homomorphic
multiplication as well, as demonstrated below.
Let (n,G,G1, e, g, h) be the public key used for encrypting messages m1, m2 ∈
{0, 1, ..., T} to get the ciphertexts C1, C2 ∈ G1. The additive homomorphism can
be achieved by computing the product C = C1C2h
r for a random r ∈ {0, 1, ..., n−
1}.
Two ciphertexts can also be multiplied once by using bilinear map. If g1 =
e(g, g) and h1 = e(g, h), then g1 is of order n whereas h1 is of order p. For some
unknown α ∈ Z, determine h = gαq.
Let C1 = g
m1hr1 ∈ G and C2 = g
m2hr2 ∈ G.
Now given C1andC2, a valid encryption of the product m1.m2 mod n can be
calculated as follows.
Select a random r ∈ Zn and calculate C = e(C1, C2)h
r
1 ∈ G1.
Now C = e(C1, C2)h
r
1 = e(g
m1hr1 , gm2hr2)hr1
= gm1m21 h
m1r2+r2m1+αqr1r2+r
1 = g
m1m2
1 h
r¨
1 ∈ G1.
where r¨ = m1r2 + r2m1 + αqr1r2 + r is distributed uniformly in Zn. Hence C is
valid encryption of m1m2 mod n ∈ G1.
In terms of application, [27] describes an application of homomorphic
encryption for secure aggregation in Sensor Networks. CryptDB [28] is
another example that allows SQL queries over encrypted data and uses Paillier
Cryptosystem to perform database operations.
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4.1 Current Scenario
The necessity of data storage over the cloud and the challenges associated with
protection of outsourced data has been discussed. Common solutions taken by
organizations today includes server-side encryption, client-side encryption or the
use of both along with strong authentication and authorization schemes to ensure
controlled access to the data stored on cloud. But despite of all these measures,
security breaches have occurred in past taking advantages of loop holes in the
system. Hence new methods in context of cloud security are always welcomed. A
framework developed as part of the work, for secure data storage over the cloud
is described below.
4.2 Proposed Framework
The proposed framework is for a hybrid cloud environment and can be extended
to support multi-cloud scenarios. This is designed with a view towards use in
client organizations who already have a private cloud setup. Client organizations
who operate using third-party cloud infrastructure can also integrate the
framework with their infrastructure. However in such a case it is assumed that
the organization has complete trust on its infrastructure provider. In both the
cases the objective is to secure the data of the organization stored with other
untrusted public clouds. A usage scenario of the framework is depicted in the
Fig. 4.1.
Before the framework can be used, some initialization steps need to be
followed. The first step involves generation of public and private keys. The public
cloud services with which interactions are to be done are provided in the next
step. The public key file is sent to all the available public clouds specified in the
previous step. This completes the initialization steps.
As new providers are added, the public key needs to be sent to the new
providers. The private key is kept secret and is never communicated with any
third-party. It is only used within the private cloud to decrypt, the encrypted
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Figure 4.1: Framework Usage Scenario
files. In case the private key is compromised, the initialization steps must be
performed again and all files stored using the framework must be encrypted again
with the newly generated public key.
The framework mostly helps in storing, distributing, and serving files in a
secure manner so that the user do not have to manually deal with the process.
The overall flow of data proceeds as follows. First, data generated by various users
which could include data from the employees, remote collaborators, employees
from third-party organizations on contract, or individuals using services provided
by the client organization. This data is stored and uploaded in files to the cloud
infrastructure of the organization through an interface. As long as the files
remain within the trusted infrastructure of the organization it remains secure,
but when it is forwarded to other public cloud services the question on trust
arises. The proposed framework offers a convenient method to achieve interaction
with other public clouds. The uploaded files are stored in a temporary private
storage and are encrypted using Paillier Homomorphic Cryptosystem [20] to
ensure confidentiality. Now based on the configuration, the encrypted files are
sent to the public clouds. From this point onwards the security of the data is
questionable but since the contents are encrypted, confidentiality of the data is
ensured. Now at a later stage when access to a file is requested and if the file is
available within the private storage then it is returned as response otherwise the
file is downloaded from the third-party cloud service on which it is stored and
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Figure 4.2: Overview of Framework Components
then decrypted within the trusted private storage and the decrypted file is served
as response.
4.2.1 Components
The proposed framework consists of five major components as shown in Fig. 4.2.
A brief description of each component is described below.
Encryption/Decryption Module
This module is responsible for the key generation, encryption, and decryption
of files. It uses the Paillier Cryptosystem [20] for different cryptographic
operations. The key generation procedure is the same as described by the Paillier
Cryptosystem. The procedure for encrypting and decrypting files are described
next. Here the encrypt and decrypt procedures refer to the encryption and
decryption methods as described by the Paillier Cryptosystem [20]. To encryption
and decryption of files are performed in blocks of fixed size e.g. 128 bytes. The
content of each block is converted to a numerical form using their hexadecimal
representation. Then the encryption and decryption is performed on the block
and the result is appended to the encrypted file. For simplicity the procedure is
described below in form of an algorithm.
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Algorithm 8 ENCRYPTFILE (FILE,EFILE, publicKey)
1: Read FILE till end, in fixed size blocks
2: for all blocks do
3: BlockContent← Content of the block from FILE
4: e← encrypt(BlockContent, publicKey)
5: Write e to EFILE
6: end for
Algorithm 9 DECRYPTFILE (EFILE,DFILE, privateKey)
1: Read EFILE till end, in fixed size blocks
2: for all blocks do
3: BlockContent← Content of the block from EFILE
4: d← decrypt(BlockContent, privateKey)
5: Write d to DFILE
6: end for
Private Store
This framework is designed with a view to forward files to other cloud services. But
in order to process the files before sending, a temporary storage area is necessary
and Private Store offers that storage. Various operations supported by the private
store are storing user files, serving file download requests and sending files to public
clouds. Details of the operations are described in STOREFILE, DISPATCHFILE,
and ACCESSFILE procedures.
FILES database
FILES database contains basic information on each and every file stored using this
framework including the files created afterwards such as encrypted files and patch
files. It also includes the list of cloud services where the files need to be stored.
Various information stored in the database is given in Fig.4.3. File ID is a unique
value assigned to identify the file. The file name and file size attribute contain the
name of the file as uploaded by the user and its size respectively. The location
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Algorithm 10 STOREFILE (FILE)
1: Write FILE to Private Store
2: Update FILES database
3: ENCRYPTFILE(FILE)
4: Search for existing versions of FILE
5: if found then
6: Select the latest existing file version, Fold and remove others, if any
7: if size(FILE) > size(Fold) then
8: EncryptedDifferencing(Fold, F ILE,EFdiff, publicKey)
9: end if
10: end if
11: DISPATCHFILE(FILE)
Algorithm 11 DISPATCHFILE(FILE)
1: Search for encrypted version of the file, EFILE and encrypted patch file,
EFdiff
2: if EFdiff is found then
3: F ← EFdiff
4: else
5: F ← EFILE
6: Get the list of public cloud services for file storage, LocationList from the
FILES database.
7: for cloudService ∈ LocationList do
8: Send (F , cloudService)
9: end for
10: [Optional] Remove EFdiff (if any) and EFILE from Private Store.
11: end if
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Figure 4.3: File information on FILES database.
attribute contains a list of cloud storage services on which the file is stored. The
Public Key File attribute keeps the name of the public key file to be used for
encrypting the file. In case same public key file is used for all plaintext files, this
attribute will have same value. This attribute is kept for future use. It can be
used to encrypt a file with different keys depending on the cloud storage location
or other file attributes.
Presentation Module
This is the primary interface for user interaction with the cloud. It is a web
interface which provides users a list of their files stored with our framework and
allows them to upload or download files. For an administrator, it provides options
to change the configuration such as generating new keys, and adding support for
new cloud services.
4.2.2 Updation Methods
Now one problem is noticed with this framework. After encryption, the file size
becomes huge and consumes high bandwidth during transmission. Further many
files get frequent updates in which case with the normal approach, transmission
of the encrypted version of the updated file is necessary. To reduce the bandwidth
consumption the following approaches can be considered.
File Updation Approach 1 : The different versions of the plaintext file can be
compared to find the differences among them using tools such as bsdiff [29], or
xdelta [30]; and then the generated difference file can be encrypted and sent to
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Algorithm 12 ACCESSFILE(P lainF ile)
1: Query the FILES database for P lainF ile
2: if not found then
3: Print ’File Not Found!’
4: else
5: Scan for the latest version of plaintext file, P lainF ile in Private Store.
6: if available then
7: return P lainF ile in response
8: else
9: Search for the encrypted version of P lainF ile, EFile.
10: if EFile does not exist in Private Store then
11: Get the list of public cloud services for file storage, LocationList
from the FILES database.
12: Download it from any one of the public clouds in LocationList
13: else
14: Use the existing EFile
15: end if
16: DECRYPTFILE(EFile,DFile, privateKey)
17: end if
18: return DFile in response
19: end if
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the cloud providers where the file is stored. But as the providers now have the
encrypted version of original file, the public key, and encrypted version of the
patch file hence to carry out the updation would require the private key file to
decrypt the contents first. Therefore for security reasons this approach cannot be
adapted.
File Updation Approach 2 : As an alternative, the updated version of the
plaintext file is encrypted and comparison is made between the respective
encrypted versions of the file and then the resulting patch file is sent to the public
clouds as it is. As the patch file contains the difference between two encrypted
files, its content does not reveal anything of the either plaintext file. Now using
tools, the patch file can be used to create an encrypted version of the updated file
from the encrypted version of the original plaintext file.
File Updation Approach 3 (Recommended approach): Now a modified approach
for updating encrypted files that is useful in cloud scenarios is described. In this
approach, given two versions of a plaintext file, say F1 and F2 which are states of
the file at time t1 and t2, the objective is to find an encrypted patch file EFdiff
that can be used to create an encrypted version of F2 say EF2 from the encrypted
version of F1 say EF1. Now EFdiff can be sent to the public clouds where
EF1 is stored and can be used to update the encrypted file without the need for
transmission of the encrypted version of the updated file. The method for finding
encrypted difference and performing update using the difference is described in the
EncryptedDifferencing and EncryptedPatching procedures. Here the encryptAdd
procedure uses the additive homomorphism property of the Paillier Cryptosystem
to add the encrypted values. The size of the resulting patch file can be further
reduced using compression techniques.
Security Analysis:
Consider M1 and M2 as two instances of a message.
Hence, M1 = m11.m12.m13...m1n
and M2 = m21.m22.m23...m2n, where mi represents a single block of a message.
Let C1 and C2 be the ciphertexts generated by applying the encryption procedure
on M1 and M2, respectively.
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Algorithm 13 EncryptedDifferencing (F1, F2, EFdiff, publicKey)
1: Read F1 and F2 till the end, in fixed size blocks
2: for all blocks do
3: BN1 ← Content of the block from F1
4: BN2 ← Content of the block from F2
5: if BN1 6= BN2 then
6: if BN2 > BN1 then
7: d← BN2 − BN1
8: findex← BlockIndex
9: else
10: d← BN2
11: findex← −(BlockIndex)
12: end if
13: e← encrypt(d, publicKey)
14: write (findex, e) to EFdiff
15: end if
16: end for
Algorithm 14 EncryptedPatching (EF1, EFdiff, EF2, publicKey)
1: Read EFdiff till end, in pairs (findex, difference)
2: Read EF1 and write unaffected blocks to EF2
3: for all pairs do
4: if findex < 0 then
5: u← difference
6: else
7: Assign e the encrypted value at findex of EF1
8: u← encryptAdd(e, difference, publicKey)
9: end if
10: Write u to EF2
11: end for
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Now C1 = c11.c12.c13...c1n
and C2 = c21.c22.c23...c2n, where ci represents a single block of a ciphertext C.
As M2 is an updated version of M1, hence it can also be expressed as follows
M2 = (m11 + d1).(m12 + d2).(m13 + d3)...(m1n + dn),
where di = m2i −m1i, is the difference.
Now a single block of ciphertext can be expressed as,
c1i = encrypt(mi, publicKey).
Further the encrypted difference for a block i can be expressed as,
edi = encrypt(di, publicKey).
As the Paillier Cryptosystem is used for encryption which exhibits the additive
homomorphism property,
Hence decrypt((c1i ∗ edi) mod n
2, privateKey) = m1i + di = m2i
Similarly when this is applied over all the blocks, one can update the message
M1 to M2, by using the ciphertext C1 and the encrypted difference.
It is important to note that in the proposed framework the cloud providers
do not have the privateKey and hence cannot decrypt the ciphertexts. However
they can update the content in their encrypted form itself. All interactions with
the untrusted cloud involves encrypted contents only.
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Chapter 5 Implementation and Results
A prototype to evaluate the working of the proposed framework has been
developed in Python. The Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem and associated
cryptographic operations are implemented using Sage [31]. The framework
has been tested only in local environment as described in section 5.1. This
offers details on the performance of the proposed framework with respect to the
performance parameter i.e. the file size. For a full-scale cloud implementation a
python server process running in the background is needed to keep the framework
alive and to provide the client interface.
5.1 Experiment Details
To evaluate the framework eight different text files were considered. Each of
these files were updated 7 times which resulted into a new state for a file after
each update. Considering the state or version of all eight files after a change as
an instance, there were total of eight instances including the state of the original
text files. For each instance every file is encrypted, and the patch file if possible
is generated with respect to the previous instance. As described earlier the patch
file is generated using the proposed updation approach and using two popular
tools xdelta [30], and bsdiff [29]. The size of the encrypted file, the patch file
generated using xdelta, bsdiff, and proposed approach for three instances for all
the 8 text files are tabulated in Table 5.1. After generation the patch files using
the proposed approach were compressed for further reduction in size.
5.2 Performance Analysis
In order to understand the performance the different approaches, a plot of change
in file sizes for the encrypted and various patch files over the eight instances
is presented in figure 5.1. For a given instance the average value of the eight
file sizes are considered for each type. It has been observed that the proposed
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Table 5.1: Various file size information for 3 instances.
Files
Encrypted File Size
in KB
Patch File Size in KB
xdelta bsdiff Our Approach
File 1
1072 616 464 412
2968 1700 1288 188
5272 3020 2288 716
File 2
620 356 268 200
1428 820 620 140
2536 1452 1100 296
File 3
1036 596 448 388
2708 1552 1176 156
4768 2732 2072 556
File 4
1280 732 556 516
3800 2176 1652 48
6600 3784 2872 616
File 5
848 488 368 308
2260 1296 980 132
3812 2184 1656 396
File 6
448 260 196 100
848 484 368 36
1412 812 612 144
File 7
1172 672 508 480
3172 1816 1376 256
5596 3204 2432 616
File 8
2348 1344 1016 928
7112 4076 3096 540
10640 6100 4640 932
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Figure 5.1: Variation of patch file sizes over instances
approach generates smaller patch files on an average. It is also observed that
patch files generated using the proposed approach are small compared to the
ones produced by other tools in their current state. This is due to the fact
that other tools were not designed with security applications in mind and hence
have to compare and produce the patch based on the encrypted version of the
files, whereas our approach compares the plaintext versions of the files and then
encrypts the differences and uses the property of additive homomorphism to
apply the patches.
Another way to visualize the performance is to analyze the reduction in size
of the file to be transmitted. For this a parameter α which is defined as follows is
used.
α =
PatchF ileSize
EncryptedF ilesize
∗ 100% (5.1)
A plot of α for the files considered over the different instances is presented in figure
5.2.
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Conclusion and Future work
To summarize, the work gives a model of a framework that can be used by
organizations to protect and manage their data stored over untrusted public
clouds. As part of the work the possibility of using delta encoding concepts
along with homomorphic encryption scheme with additive homomorphism to
update encrypted files, instead of transmitting entire encrypted versions each
time after an update, was explored. Under the test environment, the developed
prototype has delivered promising performance results as compared to other
common solutions. Hence the proposed approach might be considered for use in
real world scenarios.
Suggestions for Improvement
The included support for the choice of cloud providers is limited and very
basic, but the framework can be extended to support new providers. Further in
the current implementation the organizations have to maintain an application at
the public clouds that will perform the updation procedure. The framework can
be developed in a manner such that the providers can easily integrate it with their
platform. Moreover working with encrypted data is computation intensive and
expensive in terms of storage, hence high performance data processing options in
the cloud can be applied for better performance. With reference to cryptographic
techniques, the proposed approach using newer homomorphic cryptosystems
having additive homomorphism, can be explored for performance benefits.
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